

3.7 Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Vada

प्रथो वादावलिङ्गागमजतविदितो दुर्मतारण्यदाहा-
हापूर्वार्थप्रतीप क्रमपरिपठित स्वाभिधा गोचरत्वम् ।
तस्य श्रीराघवेन्द्रप्रतिवरभवतो वायुवंशप्रसूते-
रेतहृद्दीपने यत्तदुचितमितिमे मानसी वृत्तिरुन्धे ॥ गुरुगुणस्तव—वादीन्द्रतीर्थ.

The problem of Determinacy and Indeterminacy of knowledge in its two phases—origin (उत्पत्ति) and cognition (ज्ञप्ति) has engaged the minds of the philosophers, in the east and the west from early times. The “pure sensation” of James; “a bare apprehension of the present” of Hobhouse; “a pure manifold” of Kant—this manifold of sense arising as a result of the actions of the things-in-themselves (*Ding an sich*) which are different from the principle of consciousness; the “immediate experience or consciousness prior to the exercise of any discriminative activity” of Lossky, imply the existence of some form of indeterminate knowledge. In opposition to this view it is contended that “not even the crudest, vaguest consciousness of a content can be accounted for, either psychologically or epistemologically without calling to our aid in the exposition the notion of a discriminative activity” (Dawes Hicks).

Some realistic thinkers like Craik (*The Nature of Explanation*) have gone so far as to reduce man to a machine by assuming that the processes of reasoning are not fundamentally different from the mechanism of the physical nature. “On our model theory neural and other mechanisms can imitate or parallel the behaviour and inter action of physical objects and so supply us with information on physical process which are not directly observable to us. Our thought, then, has objective validity because it is not fundamentally different from objective reality but is specially suited for imitating it” (*The Nature of Explanation p. 99*). The principal of uncertainty exists but it is a limitation not of reality itself but of our capacity for verification and observation. Still, according to this view, it does not justify the

confusion between the limit of existence. The notion of probability must be based upon the notion of influence and interdependence of things or causality. Yet it is asserted that mind in all its activities has its position only within the sphere of the physical world and “thought is a term for the conscious working of a highly complex machine. Man’s brain is the greatest machine imitating within its tiny net work events happening in the most distant stars, predicting their appearance with accuracy, and finding in this power of successful prediction and communication the ultimate feature of consciousness” (*The Nature of Explanation*, P. 99).

Scientific prediction implies predication. Knowledge is essentially judgement i.e. a system of relations. Intelligent action implies the education of relations (Spearman. *The Nature of Intelligence and Principles of Cognition ; The Abilities of Men* 1926). The essence of intelligence is the grasping of casual relations (Claremont. *The Nature of Intelligence* 1927). The *Gestalt* school holds that insight is the grasping or intuition of relations especially of time, space and causality. Similarly White head (*Symbolism, its meaning and effect*) thinks that “pure instinct is the response of an organism to pure casual efficacy.”

The Indian Schools चार्वाक, वैश्वकरण, जैन, विशिष्टाद्वैत, द्वैत etc., hold that all knowledge is determinate. Some totally deny निर्विकल्पक in any sense and others interpret निर्विकल्पक in a sense different from the बौद्ध and अद्वैत view points. In Advaita Vedanta निर्विकल्पक is the cognition of pure non-determinate being as such सन्मात्रम्. सविकल्पक is वैशिष्ट्य-आवगाहि (the knowledge of a thing as qualified by the attributes) and this विशेष्य विशेषण सञ्चय cannot be posited of the non-determinate perception which of the nature of तादात्म्य as in an अखण्डार्थ वाक्य. To the Buddhists on the other hand निर्विकल्पक is pure blind sensation of the unique particular स्वलक्षण, valid, unlike सविकल्पक which is determinate but false. The unique particular is devoid by relations and contains no element of ideation (प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोडं—दिङ्नाग प्रमाणसमुच्चय. Ch. I)

Among the realists and materialists the चार्वाकाः accept only सविकल्पक perception where objects are cognised as having certain perceptible qualities and निर्विकल्पक is only a hypothesis contrary to our experience.

The शाब्दिकाऽ assert that the word and thought are identical and all knowledge is verbalised experience and hence determinate.

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्कामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सापि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥
न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते ॥

—भर्तृहरि-वाक्यपदीय I. 1-125 ff.

A particular verbal expression may not be known in the beginning but still the object can be referred to in its generic character in a judgment, “it is a substance or so”; its full nature will be known when the particular word becomes known.

योऽपि प्रथमनिपाती बाह्येष्वर्थेषु प्रकाशो विशेषनिमित्तापरिग्रहापि वस्तुमात्र इदं
तदिति प्रत्यवभासयति वाग्रूपतार्थान् सत्यां उत्पन्नोपि प्रकाशो विशेषवाग्रूपं अस्वीकुर्वन्
प्रकाशक्रिया साधनतार्था न व्यवतिष्ठते ।

—पुण्यराज, वाक्यपदीयव्याख्या I-1-12

The Jaina theory also holds that all true knowledge must be a determinate cognition of the object व्यङ्गलायात्मकं ज्ञानं. Every perception when it occurs is a complete manifestation of the object, determined with all its qualities and there is no necessity to assume any passage or transition from the implicit to the explicit.

तन्निश्चयकम् समारोपविरुद्धत्वात् अनुमानवत्

—प्रभाचन्द्र, प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड p. 3.

The Sāmkhya and Bhāṭṭa Mimamsakas accept the distinction between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka. Nirvikalpaka knowledge is of the first moment of origination when the sense-contact occurs. It includes generality and particularity as one whole and therefore it is indeterminate in the sense that there is no understanding of the object as of a particular kind, like the knowledge of children and dumb people.

अक्षसन्निपातानन्तरं अविविक्तसामान्यविशेष विभागं सम्मुग्ध वस्तुमात्रं गोचरं
आलोचनज्ञानं

—शास्त्रदीपिका p. 40.

सम्मुग्धं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्यन्त्यविकल्पितम् ।

तत्सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः

—तत्त्वकौमुदी p. 27.

It is therefore a simple apprehension—a non propositional judgment. But it is real, valid and based on experience. The first nirvikalpaka cognition as ‘something’ वस्तुसामान्य is necessary for the succeeding savikalpaka as वस्तुविशेष expressed in the judgment “this is a cow”. Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka constitute two stages in the perceptual knowledge of the same object.

The Visishtadvaitins also acknowledge two forms of knowledge, determinate and indeterminate. But to them nirvikalpaka does not mean knowledge devoid of all attributes.

निर्विकल्पकमपि स्वविशेष विषयमेव
स्विकल्पके स्वस्मिन्ननुभूतपदार्थप्रतिसन्धानहेतुत्वात् —श्रीभाष्य I 1-1.

In Nirvikalpaka there is no negation of all attributes but only of some.

निर्विकल्पकं नाम केनचिद्विशेषेण विद्युक्तस्य ग्रहणम् । न सर्वविशेष रहितस्य,
तथाभूतस्य कदाचिदपि ग्रहणादर्शनात् अनुपपत्तेश्च —श्रीभाष्य

When the first cow is perceived, the knowledge is nirvikalpaka as the generic character is not perceived until the second and third cows are also perceived. In the savikalpaka knowledge of the second and third cows, in addition to the specific qualities, the generic quality persisting through all is also perceived. Hence the knowledge of the first as well as the subsequent cows is determinate. Therefore nirvikalpaka in the sense of being devoid of all attributes is a mere myth. Thus knowledge at the moment of origination उत्पत्ति as well as in the subsequent moments of comparison and contrast कृत्ति cannot but be determinate and relational. The difference is only of the degree of definiteness.

The प्रामाण्य and न्यायवैशेषिक schools, though advocating स्वतः प्रामाण्य and परतः प्रामाण्य respectively, agree as to the determinateness of knowledge both in the उत्पत्ति and कृत्ति stages. Prabhakara advocates त्रिपुटी संवित् in which the ज्ञातृ, ज्ञान and ज्ञेय are apprehended simultaneously in every act of cognition. In the judgment अहं इदं जानामि there are अहं वृत्ति, विषय वृत्ति and स्वसंवित्ति. Knowledge apprehends itself as well as its object and it is not apprehended as an object of any other cognition as that would lead to अनवस्था संवित्तयैव हि संवित् सिद्ध्यति न तु संवेद्यतया ।

Therefore all knowledge is determinate as in the judgment घटत्वेन घटमहं जानामि where the triputi implies a combination of cognition and after-cognition अनुव्यवसाय of the नैयायिकाऽ.

मुरारिमिश्र differs from Prabhakara in holding that after-cognition अनुव्यवसाय comes immediately after and not simultaneously with cognition. But this anuvyavasaya is not of the Naiyāyika kind for according to the Naiyayikas anuvyavasāya has no perception of the inherent relation समवाय between jar and jariness and hence the Naiyayikas have to resort to परतः प्रामाण्य. To Murari after-cognition or introspection has within itself the inherence-relation between the jar and jariness. Thus all knowledge is selfvalid and determinate.

घटमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायस्तु घटंघटत्वं समवायं च विषयीकुर्वन्नात्ममनि प्रकारीभूतघटं
आत्मानं तत्सम्बन्धीभूतव्यवसायं विषयीकरोति; एवं पुरोनार्तिप्रकारसम्बन्धस्यैव
प्रमात्यपदार्थत्वेन स्वतएव प्रामाण्यं गृह्णातीति —न्यायकोश p. 518.

Kumarila denies the view of Murari that cognition or after-cognition can be directly perceived. *Knowledge is अतीन्द्रिय and therefore the validity revealed by अनुव्यवसाय is not perceived but inferred from ज्ञातता, *i.e.*, in the form "I know because of the awareness of the cognisedness in me". The validity of the knowledge is also inferred from the ज्ञातता, cognisedness, which being a quality of the object and modifying it in precisely the same form, leads to valid and determinate knowledge of the object (a jar).

घटो घटत्ववद्दिशेष्यक घटत्वप्रकारक ज्ञानविषयः घटत्वप्रकारक ज्ञातत्ववत्त्वात्
—न्यायकोश p. 517

Though the भट्टाऽs resort to inference, they differ from the Naiyayikas who hold to परतः प्रामाण्य (*i.e.* validity is revealed by something other than that which reveals knowledge). The Bhattas on the other hand hold that the same thing which reveals the knowledge also reveals the validity and hence स्वतःप्रामाण्य (self-valid).

The नैयायिकाऽs accept the two kinds of लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष, निर्विकल्पक and सविकल्पक both equally valid, determinate and based on reality. निर्विकल्पक is not of the bare particular स्वलक्षण, as the सामान्य is also revealed and it is not also a knowledge of a mere universal सामान्यमात्र or pure existence सन्मात्र. In निर्विकल्पक perception there is cognition of both generality and particularity. सामान्य विशेषं च उभयमपि गृह्णाति —न्यायकन्दली p. 189.

But it is indeterminate in the sense that the generic and specific qualities are manifested in isolation *i.e.* the qualities have not yet been brought under a relation of the qualifying and qualified

विशेष्य विशेषण सखन्धानवगाहि अव्यपदेश्यं जात्यादिस्वरूपाद्यगाहि न तु जात्यादीनां
मिथो विशेषणादिगोच्यभावावगाहीति —न्यायवार्तिक तात्पर्यटीका p. 125.

The object in nirvikalpaka is cognised as निष्प्रकारक—as “something.” नामजात्यादिरहितं वैशिष्ट्यानवगाहि निष्प्रकारकं निर्विकल्पकम् —तत्त्वचिन्तामणि p. 809. वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रज्ञानं—तर्कामृत Ch. II. It cannot be formulated in a verbal judgment until the second stage is reached but still it is a real stage of perception, through not a sense perceived fact अतीन्द्रिय. It is proved by inference for the succeeding stage savikalpaka, which is the relational knowledge of the object, will not be possible if there were no knowledge of the thing and its attributes as disjunct. entities. The contents of both are the same but in the latter there is subject-object relation expressed in a verbal judgment. The passage from one to another is explained by memory and association of ideas. The indefinite object of Nirvikalpaka is associated with a class-name supplied by memory. Hence it is possible to express the savikalpaka in a proposition “this is a cow.” Savikalpaka is not false as the Buddhists assert. The concrete object exists as a reality in both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. What is implicit in nirvikalpaka is analysed and synthesized and nothing new due to mere imagination कल्पना is added in savikalpaka.

ज्ञानेश the founder of the नवीनन्याय school has tried to re-establish the Naiyayika view of Nirvikalpaka. He admits that nirvikalpaka is not found in the practical world of experience nor in usage. He however contends that this is not enough reason to dismiss nirvikalpaka altogether. Nirvikalpaka by its very nature is beyond sense perception and naturally it cannot be found in usage, for all usage must be on the basis of savikalpaka न प्रत्यक्षं असिद्धेः अतीन्द्रियत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च । न च व्यवहारः तस्य सविकल्पक साध्यत्वात्—तत्त्वचिन्तामणि p. 809. (Bib. Ind. Ed.) He argues that relational knowledge must presuppose a previous knowledge in which the terms have no ordered relation. Otherwise there can be no determinate knowledge at all. गौरिति प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं जन्मविशेषणज्ञानजन्यं जन्मविशिष्ट ज्ञानत्वात्. The determinate cognition of a cow implies a complex judgment which includes the class character, the individual and the qualification वैशिष्ट्य between the two. Before this complex judgment

can arise, there must previously be a simple apprehension in which these three are out of order.

The philosophers who assert that all knowledge is savikalpaka only, always determinate and relational will have to acknowledge अनवस्था (infinite regress). Relational knowledge implies previous independent knowledge of the related terms and if this previous knowledge is also determinate it will require another previous knowledge and so on. न च तद्विशिष्टज्ञानमेव तत्रापि विशेषण ज्ञानापेक्षायां अनवस्थापत्तेरिति आलोचन सिद्धिः—तत्त्वचिन्तामणि p. 814.

Gangesa further shows that the previous non-relational knowledge has no other source but perception. It cannot be due to a memory of the class character गोत्व, as memory presupposes perceptual experience. In the first determinate experience therefore, in the absence of a previous perception of गोत्व, memory cannot exist. Neither can the memory be attributed as the result of a previous life as that assumption is logically unnecessary.

Further how is that memory stimulated? To resort to अदृष्ट (un-perceived distiny) is a desperate way. The Naiyayikas admit that there can be sense contact with गोत्व (cow hood) and this creates the nirvikalpaka ज्ञान of गोत्व. If this is admitted as the stimulant to the memory impression, it is as well to admit that the knowledge of gōtva is the result of sense-object contact, even as in the other cases *i.e.* of the individual cow. It is the universally accepted rule that when perceptual knowledge and memory have identical causes the resulting knowledge is of the nature of perception and not memory.

य एव गोत्वेन्द्रियसात्त्विकर्षत्व निर्विकल्पके हेतुः स एव संस्कारोद्बोधक इति चेत्, तर्हि
अत्र क्लृप्तकारणाभावात् गोत्वेन्द्रिय सात्त्विकर्षात् गोत्वानुभव एव स्यात्, स्मरण सामग्रीतो
ऽनुभव सामग्र्या बलत्वात् —तत्त्वचिन्तामणि p. 819.

If the Savikalpakavadin does not admit this rule, then even Vedic knowledge would be mere memory and not perceptual experience. यदि चानुभवसामग्रीतः स्मरणं; तदानित्यानां वैदिकानां च स्मरणं स्यान्नतु अनुभवः—तत्त्वचिन्तामणि p. 819. So also the knowledge of kāla, dēśa etc. experienced in daily life would become memory knowledge only. Hence gotva knowledge is not due to memory. If a previous life is resorted to, then it might

be asked if the knowledge of gotva in the previous life is a memory or an experience. अनुभव ? If it is said that it is also a memory there is anavastha and the difficulty is only pushed back. If it is a perceptual experience, by the law of parsimony, it is well to admit perceptual experience in this life itself. Nor can it be contended that this anavastha is not a defect, and harmless like बीजाङ्कुर व्याय.

Some modern psychologists also, like Gangesa, hold that there is a direct perception of the object as a whole. "What we accept is not simply a surface (though this is the most that can be present to our senses) but a complete material thing as a whole. When we sense the the sense-datum, the house just presents itself to us as a whole, without any reasoning or passage of the mind." (Price *Perception* p. 153). The Gestalt psychologists like Kohler also hold that the whole of experience is given first and by subsequent analysis, the simpler elements are discovered. The Naiyayikas in support of their परतः प्रामाण्य say that cognition of an object (व्यवसाय) is succeeded by an after-cognition (अनुव्यवसाय) which cognises the first. Therefore introspection is necessary for the knowledge of perception of one cognition. Similarly Stout says that "psychical states as such become objects only when we attend to them in an introspective way. Otherwise they are not themselves objects, but only- constituents of the process by which objects are cognised", (*Manual of Psychology* p. 134). Alexander however distinguishes between an enjoying and a contemplating consciousness, the mind is not a contemplated object to itself and introspection is not contempeation. (*Space, Time and Daity*. Vol. I p. 12 ff.) The knowledge of knowledge is neither an explicit manifestation nor a definite perception but the feeling or an enjoying consciousness itself. Hence some Naiyayikas like Udayana admit that consciousness of consciousness is self-evident.

The Theistic schools totally deny indeterminate and non-relational knowledge. Knowledge is always relative. It is a synthetic activity bringing about a unity between the subject and objects. Then can be no knowledge bereft of the knower and the known. न च ज्ञानं ज्ञातुं ज्ञेयरहितं ज्ञानं क्वापि दृश्यम् — श्रीविष्णुतत्त्व निर्णय. Knowledge is identical with judgment construction. Implicit knowledge is not indeterminate but a perceptual

synthesis. Hence the psychological initial unit is not a bare apprehension nor indeterminate apprehension. There is no essential difference between being and presentation. Quality etc. are not अत्यन्ताभेद nor निर्विशेषाभेद from substance etc. Therefore in all perception there is only गुणादिविशिष्टबोध (knowledge of the object as qualified). Since this is साक्षिसिद्ध, it can be only savikalpaka. Sākshi always gives true knowledge प्रामिति and never भ्रान्ति. In the स्वरूप ज्ञान of Sākshi, the व्याप्ति is revealed, instead of originated, उत्पत्ति. The other schools assume difference between गुण and द्रव्य and in nirvikalpaka they reject guna etc. and accept only the वस्तुस्वरूप. The समवाय (inherence) relation between guṇa and dravya assumed by Naiyayikas is rejected by the Vedānta schools. (Cf. प्रमाणलक्षण).

श्री न्यासतीर्थ and श्री राघवेन्द्रतीर्थ in the तर्कताण्डव and its commentary न्यायदीप criticise the views of Udayana and Manikāra regarding परतः प्रामाण्य निर्विकल्पकज्ञान thus.

The Naiyayika syllogism advanced in Kusumanjali (p. 207–209) is as follows: प्रमाज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीताकार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वात् अप्रमात्वात्. Right knowledge is dependent on some causes (like दोषाभाव etc.) other than the common constituents of knowledge and is an effect, even as aprama is an effect brought about by causes other than the elements originating cognition. Here if the major term “elements other than the common constituents” means that knowledge (in the major) is all cognition, it implies that the very absence of elements generating knowledge would give rise to knowledge. Similarly the पक्ष (minor) प्रमा is already identified with knowledge, cannot be “generated by causal conditions which are not the causal conditions of knowledge.” There is वाध between the major and minor because “conditions of knowledge” and “conditions other than the conditions of knowledge” are contradictory प्रमाण्याज्ञानत्वेन तद्वेतोर्ज्ञानहेतुसया तदतिरिक्त जन्यत्वसाधने बाधातिचिरोधाच्च ॥ —तर्कताण्डव. M.O.L. Ed. p. 150.

Again the middle हेतु जन्यत्वानत्वात् (because it is originated knowledge) contradicts the major (साध्य)—“generated by conditions other than the conditions of knowledge.”

Further there is the fallacy of Sādhyavaikalya as the above sadhya

cannot be found in the example (अप्रमा). Apramā is a particular kind of knowledge and is equally bound to be originated (though with additional दोषः) by the conditions originating knowledge.

Again there is the fault of Sādhyāprasiddhi because the word ज्ञान in the major taken as all cognition would include Isvara's knowledge also which is admittedly without cause and hence there being elements other than those originating knowledge would be absurd.

ज्ञानत्वस्येश्वरज्ञान वृत्तित्वेन करणाप्रबोध्यतया

तत्रप्रबोजक सामग्र्यप्रसिद्ध्या साध्याप्रसिद्धिः

न्यायदीपः—श्रीराघवेन्द्रतीर्थ श्रीपादाः

Further there would be the fallacy of Siddhasādhana. If ज्ञान in the major is taken in its distributive sense (as any particular cognition) or collectively, then as the sadhya “conditions other than those originating knowledge” will be found in the minor, it is proving the proved. कतिपयकारण चक्रविषयक्षणां च उक्तरीत्या इन्द्रियादिभिः सिद्धसाधनात्—तर्कताण्डव p. 141.

The Naiyāyikas assume that a difference in effect implies difference वैजातीय in the cause, eg. घट and पट must have different causes. Obviously the Naiyayikas mean by वैजातीय, a generic difference. Now this generic difference cannot apply to prama and. aprama, which are both the forms of knowledge. Even in oyster shell—silver knowledge there is an element of pramā so far as “this” (इदंता) is concerned.

हेतौ विजातीयं यदि विदुःश्रुजात्यधिकरणत्वं तदा प्रमात्वस्याजातित्वेनासिद्धेः

तर्कताण्डव p. 144

इदं रजतं इत्यादौ धर्म्यशो सात्वेपि धर्मशो अभावेन प्रमात्वस्य अध्याप्रवृत्तित्वात् ज्ञानत्व
समनियतत्वाच्च इति भावः ।

—न्यायदीप p. 144.

Again the व्याप्ति is not universal for the same heat (as cause) can produce different pots (effects) with different forms and colours. पाकजरूप रसादौ कारणवैजात्येपि कार्यवैजात्य दर्शनाच्च—तर्कताण्डव p. 145.

Not only as regards उत्पत्ति but with reference to वृत्ति also there are objections. There is the fault of अन्योन्याश्रय for validity is inferred from its pragmatic utility, but pragmatic behaviour implies a prior realisation of validity. प्रमात्वे ज्ञाते प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वज्ञानं, तेनैव च प्रमात्वज्ञानं इत्यन्योन्याश्रयः

—तर्कताण्डव p. 117.

If validity is to depend on correspondence with pragmatic use, there would be अनवस्था in two directions—backwards कारणमुखी and forwards फलमुखी. If the validity resides in the conditions of the inference, as the Naiyayikas assert, then the conditions themselves must be proved to be valid. Their validity can be proved only by another inference which having similar conditions will require still another inference and so on. In the other direction also the resultant knowledge must depend on another inference to establish its own validity and so on. If to avoid this they say at some stage this particular knowledge is valid, then why not regard the first itself as self valid? Again if they assert that the correspondence to prove the validity is necessary only when there is a suspicion of dōṣha, it is nothing but acknowledging that correspondence is only a means to remove the defect but is not the cause of validity. By this our view of knowledge as self-valid will have to be admitted.

परतस्त्वे प्रामाण्यज्ञानस्यापि प्रामाण्यं संवादादि अन्यलिङ्गरूपेण अन्येन ज्ञानेन ग्राह्यं, एवं तत्प्रामाण्यमप्यनेनेति फलमुख्येका अनवस्था। एवं प्रामाण्यस्थानुमेयत्वे लिङ्गव्याप्त्यादि-ज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्थानिश्चये असिद्ध्यादिप्रसङ्गेन तस्मिन्निश्चयार्थं लिङ्गाद्यन्तरं तज्ज्ञानं प्रामाण्यनिश्चयश्च स्वीकार्यः। एवं तत्रतत्रापीरिति कारणमुख्यन्यापि इत्यनवस्थाद्वयापत्तेः। नच यत्र दोषशङ्कादिरूपाकाङ्क्षा तत्रैव संवेदापेक्षा इति वाच्यम्। तथात्वे प्रतिबन्धनिरासार्थमेव संवादापेक्षा, न तु प्रामाण्यग्रहार्थं इति मन्मतं प्रवेशापत्तेः। —तर्कताण्डव p. 90-91.

Neither can the Naiyayika from his theory of परतः प्रामाण्य and समवाय establish nirvikalpaka on a logical basis. The Nyaya-vaiśeṣhika view that द्रव्य and गुण are two independent categories and that co-inherence समवाय is a third, cannot be admitted. Therefore we cannot also admit the view that due to the inherence relation in the beginning, there is indeterminate perception of the Jāti nature and then there is determinate perception. (Jāti in Nyaya is not a mere class concept existing subjectively but is objectively existent even in the absence of an individual and it becomes manifest only in and through the individual.) There is no proof of any indeterminate perception. Even the notion of nirvikalpaka is the result of viśeṣhaṇa jñāna निर्विकल्पकाभिमतमपि विशेषणज्ञान जन्यम्—तर्कताण्डव p. 497. Therefore the view of Gaṅgeśa that we should not deny the existence of nirvikalpaka, since all proof must be of the very nature of savikalpaka, cannot be maintained. The Paddhati declares that substance etc. in the origination itself can exist due to

absence of badhaka. इध्यादि विकल्पानां प्रथममेवोत्पत्तौ बाधकाभावेन निर्विकल्पानुपपत्तेः. Therefore all knowledge is nothing but determinate. तस्मात् सर्वमपि ज्ञानं सविकल्पकमेव—तर्कताण्ड्य p. 505.

ग्रन्थो वादावलिद्रागभजतविदितो दुर्मतारण्यदाहा-
दापूर्वार्थप्रतीपकृष्णपरिपठित स्वाभिधा गोचरत्वम् ।
तस्य श्रीराघवेन्द्रव्रतिवरभृषुतो वायुवंशप्रसूते-
रेतर्ह्युद्दीपनं यत्तदुचितमिति मे मानसी वृत्तिरुन्धे ॥

गुरुगुणस्तव—वादीन्द्रतीर्थ.